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ABSTRACT: In China, road had been developed with fiscal budget until 1988. From then on highway 
projects were allowed to be built via the use of loan by state corporations. Although foreign companies are 
permitted to invest in highway projects since 1995 and domestic private companies are also encouraged to 
fund for highway projects since 2001, most of highway projects in China have been developed and managed 
by state corporations. 
In practice, problems occurred in many highway projects financed by state corporations. The paper explored 
and classified these problems by case studies. These problems mainly focuses on defective project planning 
and improper government intervention, which include: inaccurate traffic volume forecast and premature 
construction, lack of reasonable toll pricing and adjustment mechanism, lack of planning of reasonable toll 
duration, excessive government obligation, lack of strict financial supervision of toll revenue, lack of 
effective administrative supervision, direct authorization of concession right to state company and 
inexperience of regulation on concessionary projects. 
The investigation revealed that the basic reason of these highway projects lies on the imperfect current 
administration system of highway projects in China, i.e., the executive and  supervisory of development and 
operation of highway projects has not been separated clearly. Therefore, the authors propose that the 
imperfect legal framework shall be also amended and the government shall separate the affiliation between 
the competent highway authorities and state highway corporation. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
1.1 Insufficient fiscal fund for highway projects 
The construction cost of expressway is estimated 
to be approximately CNY 35 million in China (Five 
2004). From 2000 to 2005, the total demand of 
construction fund of highway is predicted be CNY 
784.6 billion; however, the governmental fund 
budget of highway construction is expected to be 
only CNY 175.9. The gap of construction fund shall 
be CNY 608.7 billion, which accounts for 77.58% of 
the necessary construction fund (Five 2004). 
 
1.2 Introduction of project financing for state 
highway companies 
Since the current fiscal budget is unable to meet 
such a large amount of fund demand for highway 
construction, governments have to withdraw from 
direct investment, construction management, and 
operation of partial highway projects. It is necessary 
for government to seek other financing methods to 
satisfy the necessary construction of highway 
projects. 
Since 1988 the central government has stipulated 
that the highway projects (including high level 
highways (Level 2 or above), large size bridges and 
tunnels) that have been built or rebuilt via the use of 
loan by state corporations may impose toll on 
passing vehicle to reimburse the highway project 
loan under the approval of the competent provincial 
government (MOT 1988). Since 1998, all 
ownerships of companies are encouraged to raise the 
development fund of highway projects based on its 
predicted operation revenue, e.g. toll income, which 
shall recoup its development funds (NPC 1998). 
Therefore, the project financing method may be 
introduced by state corporations for highway 
development. Local governments may establish 
specific highway companies and permit them to 
charge toll on passage vehicle. The toll revenue of 
highway projects may be used as the guarantee for 
state corporations to obtain funds by issuing bond 
and borrowing loan. 
 
1.3 Advantages of state highway companies in 
project financing 
Although foreign companies are permitted to 
invest in highway projects since 1995 and domestic 
private companies are also encouraged to fund for 
highway projects since 2001, most of highway 
projects have been developed by local state 
corporations, for which have more advantages than 
private companies to finance for concessionary 
highway projects for the following reasons: 
① Local state corporations may obtain implicit 
guarantee of the local government to raise 
construction funds for highway projects 
mainly through the security issuance and loan 
borrowing. 
② Highway projects don’t concern high 
technique so much as those projects in the 
sector of power, water purification and 
treatment, and waste treatment. 
③ Highway projects involve the troublesome 
procurement of land usufruct (urban land 
ownership remains with government and 
suburban and rural land ownership remains 
with villager committee). However, local state 
corporations are easy to get government 
assistance in handling of such issue. 
④ By introducing project financing for state 
corporations, local governments not only 
legally shun the prohibition that local 
governments are forbidden to issue bonds or 
borrow loans, but also overcome the 
deficiency of highway development funds and 
still maintain administrative control of 
highways. 
 
1.4 Research purpose 
In practice, problems occurred in many highway 
projects financed by state corporations. The paper 
shall explore and classify these problems by case 
studies. The reason of these problems shall be also 
investigated through the analysis of current 
administration system of highway projects in China. 
Finally the suggestion shall be provided for the 
improvement of highway project management. 
 
2. THE 5th BEIJING RING HIGHWAY 
PROJECT 
The 5th Beijing Ring Highway Project and the 
nonprofit highway project in Guangdong province 
shall be used as the examples to introduce the 
problems and analyze the reason of these problems 
of toll highway projects financed by state 
corporations. 
 
2.1 The Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation 
The Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation was officially established on September 
16, 1999, and its superior authority shifted from the 
Beijing Municipal Transportation Bureau to the 
Beijing Municipal Government (Yuan 2004). On the 
same day the deputy executive of Beijing Municipal 
Transportation Bureau (BMTB), Mr. Yuxi Bi, was 
appointed as its chairman of board of director—the 
same administrative rank as the chief executive of 
the Beijing Municipal Transportation Bureau. The 
establishment of the Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation was considered as the 
breakthrough of the investment and financing regime 
of urban infrastructure and the reform of enterprise 
management regime in Beijing. 
The Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation was charged with the responsibility of 
design, construction, operation, financing and debt 
repayment of highway projects in Beijing (Yuan 
2004). Decision of major highway projects 
undertaken by the Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation was directly submitted to 
the Beijing Municipal Government instead of the 
Beijing Municipal Transportation Bureau for 
approval. 
 
Financing 
With the intention of raising money the Beijing 
Capital Highway Development Corporation once 
planned to issue stock publicly in a stock exchange, 
however, the intention was stopped by the listing 
requirement that the company must have been in 
business for three years or more and have made 
profits for the past three consecutive years (NPC 
1999). 
By the end of 2001 The Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation had signed loan contract 
of more than CNY 14 billion with the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China via project financing 
method. The Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation offered Highway bond of CNY 1.5 
billion on May 29, 2002, which is the first public 
offer of bond to raise fund for the purpose of 
infrastructure construction. 
 
Construction 
The length of complete and newly initiated 
highway reached 100 kilometers respectively in 
Beijing, which approximately equaled to the total 
length of previous 14 years. The construction of 
highway in Beijing was expedited in 2002. It showed 
that with adequate financing capacity the highway 
company could develop projects far more quickly. 
The Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation sponsored the 5th Beijing Ring Highway 
Project, which is summarized in Table 1. The Beijing 
Capital Highway Development Corporation 
successful raised necessary development fund of 5th 
Beijing Ring Highway Project by project financing. 
However, the project still encountered problems. 
 
Table 1 Brief introduction of the 5th Beijing Ring 
Highway Project 
Project The 5th Beijing Ring Highway
Project sponsor The Beijing Capital Highway Development Corporation 
Length 98.58 km 
Technical 
indicator 2 direction, 6 track, 100km/h 
Total investment 
budget CNY 13.64 billion 
Bank Loan CNY 11.63 billion 
Commencement 
date November 2000 
Duration 3 years (Nov 2001 – Nov 2004)
Average daily 
traffic volume 117 thousand vehicles 
 
 
2.2 Problem introduction of the 5th Beijing Ring 
Highway Project 
Easy financing under low ratio of equity to debt 
The lower the ratio of equity to debt is, the 
riskier the project is. The ratio of equity to debt in 
the 5th Beijing Ring Highway Project is 
approximately 15/85, which is much lower 
compared with the minimum requirement of 25/75 
for foreign concessionaires (SPC 1995). In general 
condition, such a low ratio of equity to debt causes 
difficulty for project financing. However, the Beijing 
Capital Highway Development Corporation gained 
loan easily. 
 
Increased construction cost 
For winning bids a number of construction 
companies offered kickback, which was finally 
offset by using inferior construction material. Such 
practice negatively impact project function and 
quality to a certain extent. For example, construction 
contractors used the inferior bitumen to save 
construction cost, which inevitably decrease 
highway lifecycle (Bi 2005). At the completion of 
construction, the defective works had been accepted 
under the solicitude of Bi, the chief of Beijing 
Capital Highway Development Corporation. In the 
procurement of signal lamp, though the offer of 
signal lamp was several times of market price the 
bidder won the bid under the Bi’s solicitude (It 
2004).  
Because punctual operation is political task and 
early operation of projects is beneficial for 
concessionaire to gain profits, the defective works 
was rectified quickly. The 5th Beijing Ring Highway 
opened to traffic as scheduled. 
 
Low toll revenue 
Based on the prediction that the daily toll revenue 
was CNY 1.2 million, at the end of 30 years of 
operation, the Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation could recover the 
investment in the 5th Beijing Ring Highway and earn 
surplus revenue. However, since the 5th Beijing Ring 
Highway was completed and put into operation on 
November 1, 2003, the actual daily toll revenue was 
only approximate CNY 0.15 million, one eighth of 
the expected operation revenue according to the 
statistics taken by the Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation (Yuan 2004). 
 
Annulment of highway toll 
The levy of toll on users of the 5th Beijing Ring 
Highway was improperly annulled by the Beijing 
Municipal Government only after two months of 
operation on January 1, 2004 (Significant 2004). The 
Beijing Municipal Government unreasonably took 
over the responsibility of debt repayment which 
should be undertaken by the Beijing Capital 
Highway Development Corporation, and would pay 
it back by the fiscal revenue of Beijing government 
(Yuan 2004). 
 
2.3 Reason analysis of project problems 
Lack of effective administrative supervision 
Bi resorted to the disclosure of the maximum 
budget for awarding contract to bidders as a means 
to gain kickback, i.e., bribes. By this way Bi had 
took bribe of more CNY 2 million (Bi 2005). Since 
November 2002, the commencement of construction 
of the 5th Beijing Ring Highway, Bi had been 
impeached many times by the failed bidders of 
projects for suspecting him of taking bribes. 
However, the bidding process was not suspected and 
inquired and he still kept his position. Until April 
2004, he was officially confined to the designated 
place to confess his illegal behavior (It 2004). By the 
way, this confinement is different from arrestment 
executed by policeman; instead, it is a discipline 
punishment executed by the discipline commission 
of the Chinese Communist Party and only awarded 
to senior fellows of Chinese Communist Party before 
being impeached of guilty and arrestment. Bi was 
finally sentenced to death penalty for taking bribe 
and embezzling state capital. However, the execution 
was reprieved for two years. 
Not only did corruption occur in the 5th Beijing 
Ring Highway Project, Up to now, 16 executives of 
province-level transportation bureau in 10 provinces 
(or provincial administrative regions), i.e. 
approximate one third of 31 provinces in the 
mainland of China, have been arrested, inspected, or 
sentenced for economic crime committed during 
their administration of highway project construction 
(Bi 2005). 
 
Lack of reasonable toll pricing and adjustment 
mechanism 
Based on the prediction that the daily toll 
revenue was CNY 1.2 million, at the end of 30 years 
of operation, the Beijing Capital Highway 
Development Corporation could recover the 
investment in the 5th Beijing Ring Highway and earn 
surplus revenue. 
During the two months of operation as from 
November 1, 2003, the actual daily toll revenue of 
the 5th Beijing Ring Highway was only approximate 
CNY 0.15 million, one eighth of the expected 
operation revenue. The reason may be the inaccurate 
prediction of demand on traffic volume or high toll 
fee. 
Following the toll annulment on January 1, 2004, 
the daily traffic flow reached 117092 vehicles on the 
first day of free passage (Significant 2004). This 
result manifested that that the toll price was higher 
than the expected one and the Beijing Capital 
Highway Development Corporation had not 
prepared the toll pricing and adjustment mechanism. 
 
Excessive government obligation 
Though the capital structure of the 5th Beijing 
Ring Highway Project was unreasonable and the 
ratio of equity to debt was low, the Beijing Capital 
Highway Development Corporation gained project 
loan. The reason is that the investor of 5th Beijing 
Ring Highway Project is the Beijing Municipal 
Government, which provided the implicit credit 
guarantee of loan for the project and thus involves 
the Beijing Municipal Government in the entire debt 
payment obligation. In addition, the Beijing 
Municipal Government arbitrarily annulled the toll 
right of 5th Beijing Ring Highway Project and 
directly took over the 5th Beijing Ring Highway 
Project. This means that Beijing Municipal 
Government undertook all obligation of the 5th 
Beijing Ring Highway Project. 
 
Inexperience of regulation on concessionary 
projects 
Even though the average daily revenue is lower 
than the expected one, such lower revenue only 
occurred in two months of operation, which is a 
short period compared with the 30 years of 
concessionary term. The Beijing Municipal 
Government may suggest the Beijing Capital 
Highway Development Corporation to lower the toll 
price and may even provide necessary subsidy for 
the 5th highway. However, the Beijing Municipal 
Government arbitrarily annulled the toll right of the 
Beijing Capital Highway Development Corporation 
and directly took over the operation of the 5th Beijing 
Ring Highway Project. Such a practice discloses that 
government resorted to the administrative means to 
manage infrastructure projects. This also exposes 
that government lacks of experience and theory to 
manage the concessionary projects sponsored by 
state corporations to a certain extent. 
 
Direct authorization of concession right to state 
corporation 
The Beijing Municipal Government directly 
awarded the 30 years of concessionary operation 
right of the 5th Beijing Ring Highway Project to the 
Beijing Capital Highway Development Corporation. 
The lack of competitive selection of concessionaire 
had leaded to increased construction cost and poor 
operation performance. 
3 TOLL HIGHWAYS FINANCED BY STATE 
CORPORATIONS IN GUANGDONG 
PROVINCE 
3.1 Problems introduction 
The Guangdong Province is the first province to 
develop tollways in China. This practice of financing 
highways by franchised operation has been 
popularized all over China. The relevant departments 
of Guangdong Province Government investigated 74 
tollbooths (i.e., tollways), which are financed and 
operated by state corporations affiliated to the 
Guangdong Government. 
 
High operation and maintenance cost 
The investigation showed that the operation and 
maintenance cost is unreasonably high. For example, 
the total maintenance cost and overhead of Huaxi 
Tollbooth of Guihua Tollway reached CNY 63.72 
million, accounting for 74.95% of the total toll 
revenue of CNY 63.71 million. In another case, the 
monthly salary of toll collector in Jiangsu Province 
was approximate CNY 8 thousand, 4 times of the 
average salary of state-owned transportation 
companies in Jiangsu Province. Both these facts 
manifest that the cost control is loose in the 
operation state of toll highways 
 
Long toll period 
The investigation of Guangdong Province 
Government also reveals that the predicted loan 
repayment period of 33 nonprofit tollbooths exceeds 
30 years based on the factual loan repayments in 
2004, among which, the predicted loan repayment 
period of 6 tollbooths exceed 100 years. The 
predicated loan repayment period of 
Heyuan-Jiangmian Tollbooth even reaches 756 years 
(Xiang 2005). This fact shows that the management 
of nonprofit tollbooth financed by local state 
corporations is poor. 
 
3.2 Reason analysis 
The author summarizes the three main reasons of 
these tollway projects: 
 
Inaccurate traffic volume forecast and premature 
construction 
The toll revenue of some tollbooths was too low 
to reimburse construction loan within the planned 
periods, which originated in inaccurate traffic 
volume forecast and premature construction. For 
example, because the traffic volume of many 
highway projects in Guangxi Municipal Region was 
so inadequate that the toll revenue was too low to 
repay loan interest. The Guangxi Municipal 
Government had to raise approximate CNY 200 
million every year to disburse annual loan interest. 
 
Lack of planning of reasonable toll duration 
The Announcement of Toll Period of Highway 
Tollbooth (Xiang 2005) stated that the detailed 
scheme of certain tollway projects had not been 
prepared in 2005 regarding the transfer of toll 
highways from state corporations to government. If 
the debt of toll highway cannot be repaid within the 
prescribed period, the toll period shall be extended. 
In this case, the users of the highway shall have to 
pay the additional cost. 
 
Lack of strict financial supervision of toll revenue 
The toll revenue of some tollbooths was 
appropriated for other purpose other than the loan 
reimbursement. For example, the revenue of Huaxi 
Tollbooth at Shaoguan City, Guangdong Province 
was CNY 4.65 million last year, however, the real 
loan repayment was only CNY 0.42 million, 
accounting for 9% of total annual revenue. The 
revenue of Heyuan-Jiangmian Tollbooth was CNY 
6.49 million, however, the real loan repayment was 
only CNY 0.31 million, accounting for 9% of total 
annual revenue. These phenomena reveal that there 
is no effective financial supervision system of toll 
highway projects financed by state corporations. 
 
4. DIRECT REASON OF HIGHWAY PROJECT 
PROBLEMS 
By the study of two cases the author uncovers 
the negative influencing factors which caused poor 
performance of toll highway projects financed by 
state corporations. These negative factors caused 
excessive project cost. Table 2 summarizes the 
project performance and negative influencing factors. 
The occurrence of negative influencing factors in the 
planning stage of concessionary tollway projects 
reveals that the tollway projects had not been well 
planned. 
 
5. BASIC REASON ANALYSIS OF HIGHWAY 
PROJECT PROBLEMS 
The administration system of highway projects 
financed by state corporations (shown in Fig. 1) 
varies from the traditional project administration 
system of infrastructure projects invested by 
government (Du and Watanabe 2005). The 
management of highway projects financed by state 
corporations not only involves planning and 
construction, but also includes operation and 
maintenance. The roles of project participants in 
highways financed by state corporations thus differ 
from those in highways funded by government. 
① The twofold role of planning authority, i.e. 
administration and owner’s representative has 
changes to the sole role of administration. 
② The role of state corporations has changed into 
the owner’s representative, fund raiser and 
concessionaire. 
The implementation and approval procedure of 
infrastructure projects invested by government 
applies to the highway projects financed by state 
corporations except that the investment program and 
budget shall be prepared and decided by state 
corporations (BMG 1999). In addition, toll price 
shall be approved by local price authority (MOT 
1988, MOT, SPC, and MOF 1994, NPC1998, NPC 
2004, SC 2004). 
 
Table 2 Negative factors and performance of highway projects financed by local state companies 
Phase of project Type of tasks Negative influencing factors 
Traffic service planning Unreasonable traffic volume forecast 
Government obligation Excessive financial responsibility Unreasonable taking-over of debt payment liability 
Revenue planning 
Lack of reasonable toll pricing and adjustment 
mechanism 
Lack of planning of toll term 
Project proposal 
Feasibility study 
Financial planning Lower ratio of equity to debt Lack of financial independence 
Construction 
Selection method of 
concessionaire and 
contractors 
Direct authorization of concessionary right to state 
company 
Corruption in the selection of construction contractors 
Construction Ineffective supervision of construction 
Operation Government supervision Ineffective supervision of operation Arbitrary annulment of highway toll 
 Type of problem Project performance 
Construction Cost and progress Punctual completion of construction Increased construction cost 
Operation Cost Unreasonable high operation and maintenance cost Low toll revenue 
 
  
 
Dashed line denotes role line and solid line denotes control line 
Fig. 1 Role of participants in tollway project financed by state corporations in China 
 
Though the examination and approval procedure 
for projects with the investment of state corporations 
seems strict (Du and Watanabe 2005), corruption still 
aroused in the implementation process. The frequent 
occurrence of corruption cases disclosed the illegal 
power renting or deal of power for money was grave 
in infrastructure sector. This manifested that the 
current administration and supervision system of 
state highway project companies is imperfect 
inherently. 
By careful review and analysis of effective legal 
documents of highway projects, the author found 
that the current legal framework permit the local 
transportation authorities to directly establish and 
manage state highway corporations which are 
directly under their direct administration since 1988 
(MOT 1988, NPC 2004 and SC 2004). In such case, 
the executing and monitoring power of development 
and operation of toll highway projects was not 
separated. This imperfection in legal regulation may 
lead to ineffective supervision of local transportation 
authority, imperfect planning and poor performance 
of state highway corporations, which has been 
proved by the occurrence of negative factors listed in 
Table 2. On the other hand, local transportation 
authorities supervise the state highway projects 
invested in by them may results in the unfair 
treatment of local transportation authorities between 
state highway projects and private highway projects. 
Another defect of current legal framework is that 
local transportation authorities are allowed to 
directly award franchise to the highway project 
corporations established and financed by them since 
1988 (MOT 1988, NPC 2004 and SC 2004c). It is 
State Corporation 
 
Project Consultant 
Engineering Designer
Construction Supervisor
Construction Contractor
Transportation Authority 
or Government 
 
The Planning Authority 
The Finance Authority 
The Transportation Authority
The Zoning Authority 
Project Participant 
Project Subcontractor 
Administration 
Project Concessionaire 
Project Owner 
Role 
Planning, Construction 
and Operation 
legitimate for the Beijing Transportation Bureau to 
directly award the 5th Beijing Ring Highway Project 
to the Beijing Capital Highway Development 
Corporation. However, the direct award of franchise 
instead of competitive selection of concessionaire 
may result in careless project planning, ineffective 
and inefficient selection of concessionaire, which 
may cause troublesome project implementation 
consequently, such as the case of 5th Beijing Ring 
Highway Project. 
 
6. IMPROVEMENT MEASURES FOR 
HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
The specific project planning shall be conducted, 
which mainly include traffic service planning, 
construction and operation planning, financial 
planning, project obligation division between 
government and project company, and government 
supervision planning. The key successful issues in 
the project planning include the feasible project 
planning and the reasonable obligation division 
between government and project companies. The 
project planning model of concessionary 
infrastructure projects shall be established in the 
later chapter. 
The imperfect legal framework must be 
amended to prevent the failure of government 
supervision of toll highway projects and the unfair 
treatment of local transportation authorities between 
state highway projects and private highway projects. 
Competitive selection of concessionaires for toll 
highway projects shall be adopted instead of direct 
authorization of project concessionaires to state 
corporations and the objective selection criteria of 
project concessionaire shall be established. 
The government shall reform its management 
system of state corporations. One measure is to 
separate the affiliation between the competent 
highway authorities and state highway corporation 
and put state highway corporations under the 
jurisdiction of independent state asset management 
and supervision agencies. Other effective measures 
for regulating state corporations include compulsory 
information announcement and report to legislature. 
Since people are the nominal owner of state assets 
including public facilities, they shall have the right 
to know the real business directly and supervise the 
operation of state corporations through the standing 
committee of people’s congress. The relation of a 
state corporation to the standing committee of 
people’s congress is the similar to the relation of a 
listed company to the board of directors and 
stockholders. Therefore, a state corporation shall 
regularly disclose its financial and business 
situations. For example, the financial accounting 
report shall be publicized every half year of each 
fiscal year (NPC 1999). A state corporation shall also 
report to the standing committee of people’s 
congress and answer the queries raised by 
congressmen. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because of inadequate fiscal budget for 
infrastructure projects, local governments began to 
withdraw gradually from direct investment and 
management of infrastructure projects and 
transferred the responsibility of financing and 
repayment of infrastructure projects to state 
corporations. 
The case studies showed that the poor operation 
performance could occur in the tollway projects 
financed by state corporations because of the 
defective project planning and improper government 
intervention. The negative influencing factors 
include inaccurate traffic volume forecast and 
premature construction, lack of reasonable toll 
pricing and adjustment mechanism, lack of planning 
of reasonable toll duration, excessive government 
obligation, lack of strict financial supervision of toll 
revenue, lack of effective administrative supervision, 
direct authorization of concession right to state 
company and inexperience of regulation on 
concessionary projects. 
In order to improve the performance of tollway 
projects, government shall put more effort on the 
planning and implementation supervision of toll 
highway projects. The imperfect legal framework 
shall be also amended and the government shall 
separate the affiliation between the competent 
highway authorities and state highway corporation. 
In addition, local government authorities shall train 
their staff to be familiar with the planning and 
supervision of toll highway projects or employ 
outside consultants. The highway projects shall be 
opened to the private sector to utilize its innovative 
management experience and theory as well as 
advanced technique and technology. 
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